IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
WELLINGTON REGISTRY

UNDER

The Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 and
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990

BETWEEN

LECRETIA SEALES

Plaintiff

AND

ATTORNEY-GENERAL

Defendant

AFFIDAVIT OF ALASTAIR MACLEOD ON BEHALF OF THE
DEFENDANT

May 2015

Judicial Officer: Justice Collins
Next Event Date: Hearing commencing 25 May 2015

CROWN LAW
TE TARI TURE O TE KARAUNA
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Contact Person:
Paul Rishworth QC
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I, Alastair Donald (Sandy) Macleod, of Fendalton, Christchurch, Consultant Psychiatrist and Palliative Medicine Specialist, solemnly and sincerely affirm:

1. I am a consultant psychiatrist and palliative medicine specialist at Christchurch and Burwood Hospitals in Christchurch. I have worked as a consultation-liaison psychiatrist at Christchurch and Burwood Hospitals since 1984. During this period, while my role included attending the seriously ill medical and surgical cases in hospitals, I also pursued my professional interests in palliative care, acquiring specialist status in this emerging specialty. I assumed medical responsibility of Burwood Hospice until the provision of palliative care in Christchurch was assigned to Nurse Maude Association and then for nearly 15 years between 1998 and 2012 I worked as the Medical Director at the Nurse Maude Hospice.

2. More recently I have moved into the area of care of dementia, another common terminal disorder. However, throughout my career I have attended those dying of neurodegenerative disorders such as Huntington Disease.


4. Over this period I have published and presented at local, Australasian and international meetings predominantly on the interface between psychiatry and palliative medicine, there are only a handful of such dual trained physicians worldwide. My book on the subject The Psychiatry of Palliative Medicine: the dying mind is published in both English and German and has been well received.

5. I attach a copy of my curriculum vitae as exhibit “SDM-1”.

6. In this affidavit I address:

6.1 The role of psychiatry and psychology in palliative care;
6.2 The concepts of Dignity, Intolerable Suffering and Autonomy in end of life care; and

6.3 Suicidal thoughts and tendencies of patients suffering terminal illnesses;

6.4 The difficulties in assessing capacity and competence of patients who might seek physician assisted death.

7. I confirm I have read and understood the Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses and I agree to comply with it. Further, I confirm any opinions I express in this affidavit are within my areas of expertise and experience.

The role of psychiatry and psychology in palliative care

8. The relief of bodily, psychological and spiritual pain and discomfort is the primary clinical goal of palliative care. Management needs to be holistic and multidisciplinary involving nursing, medical, psychological, pastoral, social work, and physiotherapy professionals. In the practice of palliative medicine the medical staff need to have knowledge of, and experience in, psychology and psychiatry. Coping with illness and grief, and communication skills are all issues requiring expert psychological management of both the patient and their family.

9. Attending to psychiatric disorders which complicate terminal illnesses is also a crucial component of palliative care. These can include for example addressing disease involvement of the central nervous system, depressive and anxiety disorders, sleep disruption and delirium. Much of the pharmacology required in palliative care — including antiemetic medications, major tranquillisers, benzodiazepines and adjunctive analgesics — are medications predominantly used in the practice of psychiatry. Thus a considerable proportion of the clinical tasks that can be required in palliative care are psychiatric. However, this is, as yet, an under-developed component of many palliative care services.

How palliative care addresses patients concerns about loss of “dignity”, “intolerable suffering” and “autonomy”

10. Palliative care attempts to preserve dignity, prevent “intolerable suffering” and enhance “autonomy”. Preserving dignity in the presence of the physical and psychological ravages of terminal illness is challenging. “Dignity therapy”
championed by Dr Chochinov is a specific therapy designed to encourage fostering dignity by reflecting upon and emphasising the achievements of one's life rather than the difficulties of the current life circumstances. This is more possible in the earlier stages of illness; physical and psychological weakness limits this later in the course of illness. However, there are important strategies that nursing staff in particular can invent to facilitate independence and self-sufficiency within the limitations of the disease during these final phases of the illness. Assisting with, but not performing, teeth cleaning, lighting a cigarette or eating a meal may be such examples. It is difficult for many previously fit and healthy individuals to lose control over their destiny, and accept dependency and reliance upon others as their health fades. This is an area in which expert palliative nurses demonstrate their remarkable skills.

11. “Intolerable suffering” has never been defined. Within a population there is a huge variation of “illness behaviours” – of how one copes with an illness, be it influenza or cancer. Until the disease is experienced it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict what behaviours a patient will display. There are also cultural and religious influences upon suffering.

12. Whether suffering is determined to be ‘unbearable’ rests upon the impression of the assessing doctor for there is no formal definition of this term.¹ In jurisdictions where physician assisted suicide and/or euthanasia is available, whether or not a patient qualifies for these methods of hastened death ultimately rests on the doctor's consideration of that patient’s suffering. It is merely a judgement of the attending doctor in Dutch and Belgium under legislation. “Unbearable suffering” is a subjective concept with very wide and individualistic clinical interpretations.

13. “Autonomy” is a modern attitude exemplified in North American culture. While many claim that physician assisted death and euthanasia facilitates a patient’s autonomy at the end of their life, the reality is that in current jurisdictions where assisted dying is available it is still the doctor, or doctors, who make the final decision about whether or not to allow assisted suicide or euthanasia.

¹ Dees M, Vemooij-Dassen M, Dekkers W “Unbearable suffering of patients with a request for euthanasia or physician assisted suicide: an integrative review” (2010) 19 Psycho-Oncology 339-52.
14. In palliative care autonomy is fostered by involving or co-opting the patient in decision-making about their medical and nursing care. This is usually very helpful, though it is dependent upon a good level of communication and understanding between the patient and palliative care staff.

**Experience of suicidal thoughts or tendencies in patients diagnosed with a terminal illness**

15. In patients diagnosed with severe medical illnesses, it is thought that between 40-50 percent experience some sort of suicidal thoughts during the course of their illness. They are more likely to occur in those patients in pain, nauseous, tired or angry with their circumstances and care. However, such thoughts and ideations tend to be fleeting in the vast majority of patients. They are most often not accompanied by any seriously conceived plan or method of dying, they are not associated with depressive disorder or hopelessness and most often are just a mere expression of sadness and frustration. Such thoughts are usually motivated by a wish or a hope of escaping from their current health predicament. It is most common for patients to experience such suicidal thoughts in the months initially after their diagnosis. The suicide risk is highest for terminally ill patients during this period.

16. Suicide is surprisingly uncommon in those suffering cancer, with it being the cause of death in less than one percent of individuals suffering from cancer. The statistics are similar for dementia. Somewhat paradoxically, if the nervous system becomes involved in disease the will to live - the animalistic drive to life - is often enhanced. Most sufferers of dementia (in my unit and we are conducting a research project on this) are appalled by the thought of dying prematurely.

17. In the early stages of Huntington disease the risk is more significant. This is because Huntington disease is a genetic disorder so all sufferers have previously observed loved ones suffer the ordeals of this appalling neurodegenerative disorder.

18. It is common for sufferers of terminal illness to adjust their outlook on life in accordance with the nature and progression of their disease. This change in

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mind-set can help terminally ill patients relieve any suicidal thoughts they may have. Most cancer sufferers focus adjusts, they decide to live for the moment or the next day, hoping for an easier day or a visit from loved ones. The philosophy of palliative care advocates the shrinking of one's horizon, a focus on the here and now, and curtailing long-term plans. This is in line with the natural occurrence of this psychological withdrawal from the living (Sigmund Freud called it the detachment of old age). This existential philosophy is also a component of mindfulness, a currently popular psychological therapy.

19. I can only recall a few patients who committed suicide in the terminal phase of disease. They were men of action who used violently fatal methods.

20. There is a real risk that the liberalisation of physician assisted suicide or euthanasia would have a major impact upon suicide prevention programs. Most suicide victims are suffering from a mental illness and these are often very treatable mental illnesses if they were able to be addressed. It would cause considerable confusion for those in society suffering mental illnesses, who are already vulnerable and often more susceptible to suicidal thoughts, if health practitioners and others in society were seen to be advocating that suicide is acceptable and can be facilitated in some circumstances. There is a risk that sufferers of mental health issues may be dissuaded from seeking treatment for their condition from health professionals that might otherwise be very effective because of these mixed messages.

Assessing the capacity and competence of patients seeking physician assisted death

21. In overseas jurisdictions the reasons patients usually initiate requests for hastened death are not usually related to physical complaints. Instead requests for physician assisted suicide or euthanasia tend to be for psychological and existential reasons. The most common reasons for such requests include concerns about loss of control, wishing to die at home, loss of dignity and independence, fears about future pain, poor quality of life or self-care ability. These reasons are discussed in more detail in the article: Ganzini L, Goy ER and Dobscha SK “Oregonians’ reasons for requesting physician aid in dying” (2009) 169 Archives of Internal Medicine 489-92. A copy of this article is attached as exhibit “SDM-2”. It is fear of the future, not the present, which encourages such requests. This suggests that improved community education
and understanding about death and dying, and the services capable of adequate caring for these fears (the multidisciplinary palliative care network), would diminish the numbers of those requesting hastened death.

22. Hastened death requests are rare in palliative care (community and Hospice), but slightly commoner in oncology services. GPs are the recipients of most requests. Patients cared for at home are more inclined to request assistance in dying than those in hospital, who are more likely to request non-treatment or withdrawal of treatment. The closer to death the less frequent the requests. This is a variant of the "disability paradox", when we become disabled or limited by illness our thoughts about disability tend to change. In the Netherlands seven percent of all people whose death is expected request euthanasia preceding their death.4 Having initiated the process, 13 percent then withdraw.5 About 17 percent of Oregonians are potentially interested in aid in dying, though only 1–2 percent actually request it,6 and then 36 percent of the patients provided a lethal prescription die naturally.7 In Canadian palliative care patients 63 percent believed euthanasia should be legalised, yet only 6 percent would wish to initiate the request.8 The experience of physician assisted suicide in legalised jurisdictions is discussed in the article: Okie S "Physician assisted suicide: Oregon and beyond" (2005) 26 New England Journal of Medicine 1627-30. A copy of this article is attached as exhibit "SDM-3" to this affidavit.

23. A critical concern regarding requests for euthanasia is the stability of the request, ie. over time (several days at least) does it remain firm? The fragility of such requests is well recognised.9 This can be influenced by symptoms such as physical distress, major depression, delirium, fatigue, an unpleasant environment, neglect or over-involvement of family.

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5 Jansen-van der Weide MC, Onwuteaka-Philipsen BD and van der Wal G “Granted, uncompleted, withdrawn and refused requests for euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide” (2005) 165 Archives of Internal Medicine 1698-704.
Assessing capacity is very difficult. The presence of a mental disorder does not necessarily imply incompetence and there are no established criteria for determining whether a patient is competent to choose death. One condition that can affect the capacity of patients is delirium. It is usual when dying of chronic illness to pass through delirium *en route* to coma and death. The rate of delirium in hospice patients is perhaps as high as 80 percent. Severely depressed or demoralised persons likewise can lack capacity. It is, however, uncertain as to what capacity to decide to be assisted to die actually consists of. When is a will to die rational? The criteria used in patients who may be declining potentially life-saving treatment are: whether they are in clear consciousness, are displaying an appropriate level of sadness for the condition they are in but not to the extent of depression, have an appropriate and hopeless medical prognosis and are not under any undue external influence. I have attended in my career upwards of a dozen such persons who have declined such interventions (and subsequently died of the illness) and many oncology patients who make reasoned decisions not to pursue offers of high risk, futile treatments. But for such patients the option to re-enter treatment remains available to them, thus their decision is never quite (at least in their minds) final, even though the therapeutic opportunity may have been lost. Assessing capacity is not impossible, but it is difficult and would require highly skilled psychiatrist assessments. Psychologists would not be in a position to make such assessments as they do not have the understanding of the associated issues involved, including medication, mental and physical issues.

The prevalence of psychological distress and psychiatric illness in those dying of terminal illnesses is significant. Affectations of the brain and mind influence judgement and decision making. Most terminally ill people are at times fearful and anxious. Serious emotional turmoil is commonly associated with incapacity. At least 15 percent of terminally ill cancer patients are

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experiencing major depression, though this prevalence falls as death approaches. A similar number are dysthymic, dysphoric and demoralised. Diagnosing depression in the medically ill is notoriously difficult. Many of the physical symptoms suggestive of major depression may be caused directly by the cancer, thus the diagnosis is reliant upon psychological symptoms alone. Often in such patients therapeutic trials of antidepressant medications and psychological treatments are the only method of (retrospectively) ensuring accurate diagnosis — these trials take 4-6 weeks. Clinical surprises are not uncommon - some respond when one would not have thought they might and vice versa. After over three decades of assessing and managing mood disorders in the physically ill I not infrequently remain diagnostically uncertain when first assessing such patients. Depression can influence the wish to hasten death and treating a depression can result in a change of mind and can improve the desire for life-sustaining therapy, at least in some.

26. Regarding coercion, I have had the occasional experience of families (and rarely patients) question as to whether such assertive treatment causing such horrendous adverse effects is necessary or questioning whether their loved one should be allowed to endure the ignominy of such an illness. Presumably they are questioning the value of the patient’s ongoing survival. However, rarely in my experience is such questioning persistent or determined; usually such comments were made in a frustrating circumstance. There are, however, concerns that if physician assisted suicide or euthanasia is to become available coercion for patients to choose hastened death may become more prevalent. This could even be for reasons such as where it might allow for the convenience of arranging funeral dates ahead of time or organisers work commitments around the death of, for example, a parent. There are obvious practical advantages of such scheduled deaths for the relatives. However, a potential psychological cost may arise from the loss of that period, perhaps several days, whilst a family hovers around the death bed awaiting finality.

Whilst undoubtedly uncomfortable, and maybe inconvenient, it is a time and an opportunity for families to re-connect, reunite, and perhaps repair their differences. In hospices one commonly observes the value of this vigil for families.

27. The vulnerability of the dying and their risk of being influenced to opt for hastened death is an obvious concern, particularly if capacity is lost or family members are impatient to access inheritance for example. For many, particularly adolescent children (often less so for younger children), observing death for the first time can be distressing and disturbing. Dame Cecily Saunders maintained that a crucial role of palliative care is to look after the dying well so that the next generation would be less fearful of the process when their turn came. Sanitising dying, however, may have risks for future generations who may come to expect and demand physician assisted death or euthanasia. This is perhaps just one area where the slippery slope argument can be raised as a concern.

28. Another area where the slippery slope may be seen to be of particular concern is those suffering from chronic psychiatric illnesses. In the Netherlands a firm line has been drawn in this regard, but not so in Belgium. I have recently reviewed an article submitted to a European journal (not yet accepted for publication) describing the first 100 psychiatric patients allowed physician assisted suicide in Belgium. There are significant concerns about physician assisted death being provided to such patients. In particular a major concern in relation to these patients is whether or not adequate treatment of the underlying condition has occurred prior to facilitating their hastened death and whether the diagnoses established were robust – a significant proportion had personality disorder diagnoses. The “slippage” is most likely to be diagnostic, veering toward allowing requests from those who suffer the “burden of living” rather than those who suffer intractable severe psychiatric illness.

29. An additional area of concern is that of Advance Directives. For example if a person writes up an Advanced Directive stating that they would wish for physician assisted suicide or euthanasia if they were to develop dementia or some other neurological disease, yet during the course of their terminal illness and cognitive decline they change their mind, could that Advanced Directive
still be relied upon? Such cases are apparent in the Benelux countries but the
directive is honoured. In a sample of 208 deaths under the euthanasia law,
representing 12 per cent of the deaths during 2007 in Flanders, 32 per cent
were administered life-ending drugs without their explicit request. The
decisions to terminate the lives of these elderly, hospitalised patients in
comatose or demented states, who had previously indicated a wish for life not
to be needlessly prolonged, were made by medical staff in agreement with the
family, usually following a sudden decline in the patient's health, leaving them
unable to communicate. Hastened death requests have the potential to be a
colossal issue in chronic neurological and psychiatric illnesses. I discuss these
issues in an article I have authored: Macleod AD "Assisted dying in liberalised
jurisdictions and the role of psychiatry: a clinician's view" (2012) 46 (10)
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 936. A copy of this is
attached as exhibit "SDM-4" to this affidavit.

It is well recognised that for a period (perhaps up to a few days) after enacting
suicidal behaviour (or definitively deciding on making an attempt) the person's
mental state improves - both mood and anxiety are transiently eased by the
self-destructive action. Every psychiatrist has been 'fooled' by this
phenomenon at some stage in their career. This may account for the
observation that in Oregon 36 per cent died without consuming the lethal
drug. As Quill commented "Perhaps the knowledge that they could end their
life if they so desired makes them feel less trapped - therefore freer to keep
going". To address these psychological aspects of patients at the end of their
life there needs to be greater emphasis on the provision of more honest and
accurate disease prognoses (doctors tend to over-estimate prognoses), as may
firmer emphasis on AND (Allow Natural Death) guidelines, more accurately
diagnosing dying, and support and encouragement for those withdrawing from
futile treatments. Uncertainty is psychologically stressful, certainty is easier to
manage.

17 Chambonre K, Bilsen J, Coers J et al "Physician assisted deaths under the euthanasia law in Belgium: a
(Exhibit "SDM-3").
AFFIRMED

at Christchurch this ___ day of May 2015
before me:

Alastair Donald Macleod

Phillipa Frances Shaw
Solicitor
Christchurch

A Solicitor of the High Court of New Zealand
CURRICULUM VITAE

22/04/2015

PERSONAL INFORMATION:

Name: Alastair Donald (Sandy) Macleod
Date of Birth: 23/03/51
Sex: Male
Address: 46 Kotare Street,
Fendalton,
Christchurch, 8041
New Zealand.

Phone: 64-3-3430822 (home), 64-3-3754274 (work)
Fax: 64-3-3430823 (home), 64-3-3754267 (work)
Email: ad.macleod@cdhb.health.nz (work), admacl@xtra.co.nz (home)

QUALIFICATIONS:
M.B.Ch.B. (Otago), 1974
E.C.F.M.G., 1974
M.R.A.N.Z.C.P., 1982
F.A.Ch.P.M.(R.A.C.P.), 2000

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS / MEMBERSHIPS:

Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists
Royal Australasian College of Physicians (Chapter of Palliative Medicine)
Australian and New Zealand Society of Palliative Care
Neurologic Association of New Zealand

LANGUAGES:

English

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:

PRESENT POSITION:
Consultant Psychiatrist, Psychiatric Consultation Service, Christchurch and Burwood Hospitals. 1985 to present.
Consultant Psychiatrist and Physician, Brain Injury Rehabilitation Service, Burwood Hospital, 2014 to present.
Consultant Psychiatrist, Health Care of Elderly, TPMH. 2014 to present.
Clinical Senior Lecturer, Department of Psychological Medicine, Christchurch School of Medicine. 1982–1997 and 2001 to present
Adjunct Associate Professor, Health Sciences Centre, University of Canterbury. 2010 to present
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:
Medical Director, Brain Injury Rehabilitation Service, Burwood Hospital. 1999 - 2014.


Medical Advisor, Hospice NZ. 2012 -2013

Medical Director, Nurse Maude Hospice. 1998 - 2012

Visiting Psychiatrist (and founder with Dr L. Briggs, Social Worker), Refugee and Migrant Service, Family Mental Health Service, Christchurch. 1999 - 2010.

Senior Lecturer, Department of Psychological Medicine, Christchurch School of Medicine. 1997 - 1998

Consultant, Brain Injury Rehabilitation Service, Burwood Hospital. 1995 - 1996

Medical Director, Burwood Hospice. 1993 - 1996


Consultant Psychiatrist, Consultation - Liaison Service, The Princess Margaret Hospital, Christchurch. 1986 - 1989

Consultant Psychiatrist, Consultation - Liaison Service, Christchurch and Burwood Hospitals. 1985 - 1986

Private Psychiatric Practice, Calvary Clinic, Christchurch. 1984 - 1986

Consultant Psychiatrist, Sunnyside Hospital, Christchurch. 1983

Medical Officer Special Scale, Sunnyside Hospital, Christchurch. 1982

Psychiatric Registrar, Department of Psychological Medicine, University of Otago, Dunedin. 1978 - 1981

General Practitioner, Christchurch, NZ and Leyton, London, UK 1977

Ship Surgeon, Port Line. 1977

House Surgeon, Wellington Hospital. 1975 - 1976

OTHER RELEVANT EXPERIENCE

EXPERIENCE WORKING in an OVERSEAS COUNTRY (not previously listed):

Honorary Clinical Assistant, Department of Psychiatry (Prof. J. Shurley), University of Oklahoma, USA. March, 1984

Honorary Clinical Assistant, The National Hospital for Nervous Diseases and Neurosurgery (Prof. M. Ron), London, UK. March - June, 1984

Honorary Clinical Assistant, Consultation - Liaison Service, Massachusetts General Hospital (Profs T. Hackett and N. Cassem), Boston, USA. July - August, 1986

Palliative Care Physician, Territory Palliative Care Service, Darwin, Australia. June - July 2003

RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
RESEARCH EXPERTISE
Special Interests: Psychiatric sequelae of trauma
Psycho-oncology / palliative care
Neuropsychiatry

RESEARCH GRANTS
War Pensions Medical Research Trust Board (1998) $24,490
Campbell Ballantyne Fellowship (2007) (with Jane Vella-Brincat) $30,000

DISTINCTIONS
Kathleen Todd Fellowship in Psychiatry 1984
Dawn Short Trust fund Scholarship 1984

TEACHING ACTIVITIES
RMO Orientation Course “Looking after Yourself” - a yearly lecture to new house-surgeons 1997 to present.
Palliative Care (4th Year Medical Students) - Hospice attachment clinical morning (X6/year) 2000 to 2008
MSM 708 Chronic Pain and Psychiatry: 2005 to present
Convenor: Christchurch Hospitals Friday Clinical Meeting 2000-2004 (medical student attendance)

Collegial education - my major interest and teaching investments have been educating colleagues through the liaison component of consultation-liaison psychiatry, presentations and discussions at hospital grand rounds, presenting at pharmaceutical sponsored meetings for General Practitioners

PUBLICATIONS
BOOKS:
Macleod RD, Vella-Brincat J, Macleod AD. The Palliative Care Handbook; incorporating the Nurse Maude Palliative Care Formulary: guidelines for clinical management and symptom control.


BOOK CHAPTERS:


REFEREED JOURNAL ARTICLES:
Macleod AD. Calenture - missing at sea? *British Journal of Medical Psychology* 1983; 56: 146-150


Sellman JD, Kendal NAS, Macleod AD. The use of opioid medications in patients with chronic non-malignant pain who have drug dependency. *Drug and Alcohol Review* 1995; 14: 109-113


Macleod AD. Disgusting patients. *Progress in Palliative Care* 1999; 7: 299-301

Macleod AD. Psychiatric casualties of World War II. *New Zealand Medical Journal* 2000; 113: 248-250


Macleod AD. Multiple sclerosis and palliative medicine (Review article). *Progress in Palliative Care* 2001; 9: 196-198

Macleod AD. C - L Psychiatry in mid-life crisis. Australasian Psychiatry 2002; 10

Macleod AD. The death of Don Quixote. Progress in Palliative Care 2002; 10: 260-261


Macleod AD. Schnitzler and death. Progress in Palliative Care 2003; 11: 134-135


Macleod AD (Sandy). Mrs Hitler and her doctor. Australasian Psychiatry 2005


Briggs L, Macleod AD (Sandy). Demoralisation - a useful conceptualisation of non-specific psychological distress among refugees attending mental health services. The International Journal of Social Psychiatry 2006; 52: 512-524

Macleod AD (Sandy). Delirium: the clinical concept. Palliative and Supportive Care 2006; 4: 305-312

Macleod AD. The management of terminal delirium. Indian Journal of Palliative Care 2006; 12: 22-28


Macleod Sandy. "If there is a doctor aboard this flight...": issues and advice for the passenger-psychiatrist. Australasian Psychiatry 2008; 16: 233-237

Macleod AD. Psychotherapy at the end of life: psychodynamic contributions. Progress in Palliative Care 2009; 9: 3-12

Heitger MH, Jones RD, Macleod AD, Shell DL, Frampton CM, Anderson TJ. Impaired eye movement in post concussion syndrome indicate sub-optimal brain function beyond the influence of depression, malingering, or intellectual ability. Brain 2009; 132:2859-2870

Macleod AD (Sandy). Lightening up before Death. Palliative and Supportive Care 2009; 7:513-516

Macleod AD (Sandy). Comment: Complex Case: Head trauma, dissociation, & possible development of multiple personalities. Personality and Mental Health 2009; 3: 305-306


Macleod AD (Sandy). Post concussion syndrome: the attraction of the psychological by the organic. Medical Hypotheses 2010; 74: 1033-1035

Macleod AD (Sandy). Psychiatry on the Burma -Thai Railway (1942-1943): Dr Rowley Richards and


Macleod A D (Sandy). Editorial: Euthanasia and physician-assisted death. *NZMJ* 2012;125: 127-31


Macleod A D (Sandy). Australasian contributions to the shell shock literature of World War 1. *Australasian Psychiatry* 2015 (Accepted for publication).

**LETTERS TO EDITOR**


Macleod AD. Putnam, Jackson and post-traumatic stress disorder. *Journal of Mental and Nervous Disease* 1993; 181: 709-710


Macleod AD. Use of sedatives in palliative medicine. *Palliative Medicine* 1997; 11: 493-496


Macleod AD. Akathisia and an unusual symptomatic treatment. *Palliative Medicine* 2008

Fairhall M, Reid K, Vella-Brincat JWA, Walker J, Chin PKL, Jensen BP, Macleod Sandy (AD), Begg EJ. Exploring hospice patients' views about participating in research. *J Pain Symptom Manage* 2012; 43: e9-e11

NON-REFEREED JOURNAL ARTICLES:

Macleod AD. Depressive illness. *New Zealand Practice Nurse* 1999; 1: 36-38


Macleod AD. Post-traumatic stress disorder. *New Ethicals* 1996; April: 77-85


Macleod AD. Depression in the medically ill. *New Ethicals Journal* 2000; May: 61-65


Macleod AD. Delirium; part I: diagnosis and aetiology. *New Ethicals Journal* 2002; March: 59-64

Macleod AD. Delirium; part II: management. *New Ethicals Journal* 2002; April: 59-64

Macleod AD. Sedation in terminally ill patients. *New Ethicals Journal* 2002; September: 37-41


Macleod AD. The death of Mrs Hitler. *Ngau Mamae* (the Quarterly Journal of the NZ Pain Society) 2003; 3: 21-23


OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONFERENCE INVOLVEMENT

Convenor: Australian and New Zealand Society of Palliative Care 3rd Biannual Scientific Conference, Christchurch 1996

Co-convenor: 39th Congress of the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists, Christchurch 2004
Convenor: Annual RANZCP (NZ Branch) Conference, Queenstown, September 27-30, 2011

AUDIOVISUAL RECORDINGS


OTHER CREATIVE WORKS:


PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL ADVICE AND SERVICES

Medicines Assessment Advisory Committee (MAAC) Ministry of Health/Medsafe, 1997 - 2011.

Independent Medical Advisor - Medical Misadventure Unit, Accident Compensation Corporation, 2003 to present.


Panelist: Veterans Health Expert Panel 2014 to present.


SERVICE TO EXTERNAL ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES


COMMUNITY SERVICE

CONTINUING EDUCATION

i) Media Commentaries

"The evil shadow of war" - David Clarkson, *The Press*, April 24, 1999

"Euthanasia - the doctors'dilemma" (Opinion) - AD Mootoo, *The Press*, April 20, 2002


ii) Conferences, seminars, workshops

RANZCP (NZ Branch) Annual Conference 1990. "Tattooing - a sign of psychopathology"

NZ Pain Society, Annual Scientific Meeting 1992. "Drug abusers, terminal illness and opioid"

NZ Society on Alcohol & other Drugs, 1st Annual Conference 1992. "Chronic pain in the addicted patient"
Palliative Care Update for General Practitioners Workshop (Glaxo Foundation), Auckland 1995. “The confused patient”
Palliative Care for GPs (SKB Pharmaceuticals) 1995. “Symptom Control in Palliative Care”
ANZSPM Biennial Conference 1996. “Psychostimulants in terminal depression”
International Medical Society of Paraplegia, Annual Scientific Meeting 1996. “Opioids and spinal pain”
Palliative Care Workshop, Waikato Postgraduate Medicine 1996. “Antidepressants”
National Consultation Liaison Psychiatry Meeting 1998 “Legless”
Roche Psychiatric Weekend, Queenstown 1999. “The psychiatry of World War I (1914-1918)”
NZ Pain Society, Annual Scientific Meeting 2000. “Pethidine - not the preferred opioid for chronic non-malignant pain”
Fifth World Congress of Psycho-Oncology, Melbourne 2000. “Disgusting patients”
Neurologic Association of NZ, Annual Scientific Meeting 2000. “Concussion Clinic”
Palliative Care Study Day, Nelson Marlborough Health Services (Invited Keynote), Blenheim 2000. “Symptom control in palliative care”
Obesity Meeting for GPs (Abbott Labs.) 2000. “Psychological aspects of obesity”. Christchurch
RANZCP 36th Congress, Canberra 2001. “Conversion paraplegia”
Hospice Palliative Care Seminar, South Canterbury Hospice 2002. “Depression and dying”
Queenstown Course in Internal Medicine (Invited Keynote), 9-12 September 2004. "C - L Psychiatry Update"

Australasian College of Anaesthetist's Congress, Auckland 2005 (Invited Speaker). "Pain, Opioids and Personality"


World Federation of Neurology Congress, Sydney 2005 (Invited Speaker). "Palliative Care of Dementia - Huntington's and Alzheimer's"


Indian Palliative Care Conference (Invited Speaker), Chennai, 2006. "The management of terminal delirium"

ANZSPM Biennial Conference, Newcastle 2006. "Posttraumatic growth or PTSD?"

International Congress of Neuropsychiatry (6th), Sydney 2006 "Huntington's disease and disgust"


NSW Society of Palliative Medicine (16th Annual Symposium 2007) (Invited Speaker). "The disgusting patient", "Personality, pain and pills"

Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists Conference, The Vintner’s Art (Invited Speaker), Napier, 2007 “World War II Veterans”

‘Kochipallcon’, Indian Palliative Care Association (Invited Speaker), Kochi, Kerala, India. 8-10 February 2008. "CNS Adverse Effects of Opioids".


The Press Christchurch Writers Festival: The Brain that Changes Itself; Norman Doidge in conversation with Dr Sandy Macleod. 4-7 September, 2008


Clinical Controversies: examining the evidence (Invited Speaker). "Palliative Care and Psychiatry". Melbourne, 25-26 October, 2008

ANZSPM Palliative Care Forum. Visiting Lecturer: "Confusion and Consciousness". Peter McCallum, Melbourne; Hobart; RPAH, Sydney; Royal Brisbane Hospital, Brisbane. 4-7 May, 2009

NZ Hospital Pharmacist Association Psych Sig Conference (Invited Speaker) “Psychiatry and Palliative Medicine”, Christchurch, August 15, 2009

2nd World Congress of Cultural Psychiatry, Norcia, Italy, September 27-30. "Depression or Demoralization in Refugees"


RANZCP Queensland Branch Dinner Meeting 8 November 2012. Fear and Anxiety: the psychological aftermath of the Christchurch earthquakes.


iii) Public lectures

iv) Provision of continuing education

Hospice Education Trust. Yearly seminar on psychiatry and palliative care.

Background: Oregon is the only US jurisdiction with a legal process, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, that allows terminally ill patients to obtain physician aid in dying (PAD).

Methods: Fifty-six Oregonians who either requested PAD or contacted a PAD advocacy organization completed a survey indicating the importance of 29 reasons for their interest in PAD on a scale where 1 was not important and 5 was very important; 28% of people referred from the PAD advocacy organization enrolled in the study.

Results: Forty-one patients died by the end of the study; 18 received a prescription for medication under the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, and 9 died by lethal dose of medication. The most important reasons for requesting PAD, all with median scores of 5, were wanting to control the circumstances of death and die at home; loss of independence; and concerns about future pain, poor quality of life, and inability to care for one's self. All physical symptoms (eg, pain, dyspnea, and fatigue) at the time of the interview were rated as unimportant (median score, 1), but concerns about physical symptoms in the future were rated at a median score of 3 or higher. Lack of social support and depressed mood were rated as unimportant reasons for requesting PAD.

Conclusions: At the time they express initial interest in PAD, Oregonians are motivated by worries about future physical discomfort and losses of autonomy and function. When confronted with a request for PAD, health care providers should first work to bolster the patient's sense of control and to educate and reassure the patient regarding management of future symptoms.

Arch Intern Med. 2009;169(5):489-492

Methods

Patients were recruited for our study from 2 sources. The first group included patients who contacted Compassion and Choices of Oregon (CCO), an organization that informs individuals about end-of-life choices and offers services to those who choose aid in dying for information about PAD, which resulted in CCO opening a client file. During the past decade, CCO staff have given information to or attended the deaths of three-quarters of Oregonians who chose legal PAD. This organization sent letters of invitation to every person who contacted them and who had made an explicit request for a lethal dose of medication under the Oregon Death with Dignity Act to a physician, hospice employee, nurse, or caregiver; was considered mentally capable; and in whom at least 1 physician predicted death within 6 months. The second group included patients who made an explicit request for PAD as outlined in the ODDA. These patients were referred by ethics consultants and palliative medicine and oncology specialists at 4 large medical centers in northwest Oregon.

In all cases, the referring agency or health care provider notified requesting patients about the opportunity to take part in the study, and interested patients then contacted the re...
Table 1. Characteristics of 39 Study Participantsa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Study Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age, mean (SD), y</td>
<td>65.8 (11.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level, mean (SD), y</td>
<td>16.1 (3.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>27 (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>22 (39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>66 (88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled/Trained/ Licensed</td>
<td>34 (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married or with partner</td>
<td>46 (66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living situation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>53 (68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>3 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminal diagnosis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancer</td>
<td>43 (77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis</td>
<td>9 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardiovascular disease</td>
<td>5 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hepatits C</td>
<td>1 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospice enrolled</td>
<td>20 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EODS Score</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>10 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>24 (32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>14 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>12 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing data</td>
<td>1 (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations: AIDS, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome; EODS, Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group.
*aData are given as number (percentage) of participants unless otherwise indicated.
6A score of 0 indicates fully active, no functional restrictions; 1, restricted in strenuous activity but able to carry out light work; 2, ambulatory and able to perform self-care, unable to work, and up and about more than 50% of waking hours; 3-4, limited self-care or completely disabled.

The chief reasons participants were interested in taking part in the study were the ability to control the time and manner of death, 18 (44%) indicated they explicitly wanted a lethal prescription, and the investigators' experience in evaluating and caring for such patients. Twenty-seven participants ranked the importance of 29 possible reasons on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 was "reason not at all important in decision to request a lethal prescription" and 5 was "reason very important in decision to request a lethal prescription." Data are presented as frequencies and proportions for categorical data, means and standard deviations for normally distributed data, and medians with interquartile ranges for highly skewed data. The Mann-Whitney test was used to compare continuous but skewed data. All a level was set at .01 to adjust for the large number of analyses, and all tests were 2-sided.

Compassion and Choices of Oregon invited 178 clients to take part in this study. Of these, 12 (7%) were ineligible because they had died, were moribund, lived outside of Oregon, or were not terminally ill, and 47 (28%) contacted the research team expressing interest in participating. The remaining 11 participants were referred from 1 of 4 other medical centers (referring health-care providers did not keep track of the number of persons notified about the study). A total of 58 agreed to participate; however, 2 did not complete the section of the study measuring reasons for the request. Study participants were equally divided by sex and were predominantly white, well educated, and lived independently (mean age, 66 years) (Table 1). The most common terminal diagnoses were cancer and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Only 1 in 3 participants were enrolled in hospice at the time of the survey, and fewer than half were married. Forty-one participants (73%) died a median of 2 to 3 months after they participated in the study. At death, 16 (44%) had received a prescription for medication under the ODDA, and 9 (22%) died by lethal ingestion.

Study participants confirmed their strong interest in PAD: 53 (98%) strongly supported legalization of PAD, 47 (94%) sought information on obtaining PAD from CCO, and 46 (82%) indicated they explicitly requested PAD. Fifty-four participants (96%) discussed their attitudes about PAD with family and friends, and 47 (86%) indicated that the people closest to them would probably support their choice to pursue PAD. The desire to die in the 2 weeks before the interview was low (mean [SD], 2.1 [3.3]).

The chief reasons participants pursued PAD, all with median scores of 5, were loss of independence, wanting to control the time and manner of death and die at home, and the prospect of worsening pain or quality of life and the inability to care for themselves (Table 2). Other key reasons, with median scores of at least 3.5, were losing autonomy, intolerable deaths, perception of self as a burden, loss of dignity, and fear of mental confusion in the future. Physical symptoms experienced at the time of initial interest in PAD were much less important: pain, shortness of breath, fatigue, confusion, and loss of bowel and bladder control were all rated a median of 1. In contrast, all physical symptoms that the patient anticipated in the future were rated a median of 3 or higher. Most respondents did not endorse existential reasons, such as feeling ready to die, that life tasks were complete, or that life...
was pointless. Social issues were rated overall as not of concern; lack of social support and perception of self as a financial drain were both rated with a median score of 5. Participants did not acknowledge depression as an important reason for pursuing PAD. There were no statistically significant differences in reasons for the request in comparing those who received a lethal prescription and those who did not (data not shown).

Of 56 subjects, 41 (75%) rated a single most important reason for asking for PAD. Eleven requested PAD primarily to feel in control, 5 to avoid dependence on others, 3 because of worries about pain in the future, 4 because of worries about poor quality of life in the future, and 3 because of worries of loss of sense of self. All other most important reasons were chosen 2 times or less.

**COMMENT**

Oregon is one of the few jurisdictions internationally and the only US territory that has a legal process allowing patients to obtain PAD. The ODS allows a physician to prescribe a lethal dose of medication to be self-administered by a requesting patient whose life expectancy is less than 6 months. A second physician must confirm the limited life expectancy and that the patient is capable of making the request. Between 1997 and 2007, 341 Oregonians died by legal prescription PAD, 141 of whom were over 80 years of age. There were no statistically significant differences in reasons for the request in comparing those who received a lethal prescription and those who did not (data not shown).

Our data suggest that when patients first request PAD, they do so not because of physical symptoms or quality of life at the time of the request but in anticipation of future suffering they perceive as intolerable. Their desire to die is not strong, and they do not believe that their life is poor in quality, meaningless, or worthless. Rather, they appear to be protecting against the risk of future experiences they do not believe they can endure. Although future physical symptoms are important considerations for these individuals, they are more strongly motivated by the prospect of loss of autonomy—loss of control, quality of life, and ability to remain at home, with looming restrictions and dependence on others.

We are aware of only one other study that gathered data directly from persons actively considering or pursuing PAD. Pearlman et al completed longitudinal, qualitative interviews of 12 patients and family members of 23 additional patients from the Pacific Northwest who were actively pursuing PAD (including 17 who ultimately self-administered the medications). They also found that loss of sense of self, fears about the future, negative experiences with dying, and desire for control were prominent reasons for pursuing PAD. Unlike our study, they found that experiences of weakness, discomfort, pain, and functional losses were more prominent reasons. In addition to differences in study design, this may reflect that our study participants were seen once, whereas Pearlman et al. studied participants longitudinally, perhaps closer to death. Furthermore, our study focused on patients, not family members, as primary sources of information.

There are several limitations in our study. Our results focus on patients at the time they are first requesting PAD, yet in 6 requests are ultimately not honored by physicians. Furthermore, among those who are successful in obtaining a prescription, some may wait until they are more ill and symptomatic to take it. For example, 20 of 56 of our study participants (36%) were enrolled in hospice. Similarly, physicians reported that 32% of Oregon patients were enrolled in hospice at the time of the first PAD request. In contrast, 86% of Oregonians who die by lethal ingestion are ultimately enrolled in hospice. Although experienced physical symptoms were not a motivator for initially pursuing a lethal dose of medication, they may be the choice of the patient to ultimately die by a lethal prescription.

A second limitation is that only 47 of 166 clients (28%) invited by CCO to participate enrolled in the study; those who volunteered to participate in our study may not be representative of other Oregonians at the time they first request PAD. For example, in our study, in 4 patients had limited self care or complete disability. In contrast, Oregon physicians reported that 59% of patients were con-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Median Score (IQR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wasting to control circumstances of death</td>
<td>5 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatigue or lack of energy</td>
<td>5 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future inability to care for self</td>
<td>5 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of independence</td>
<td>5 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wishing to die at home</td>
<td>5 (1.25-5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of self as burden</td>
<td>4 (1-5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of dignity</td>
<td>4 (1-5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witnessed bad death(s)</td>
<td>4 (1-5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future mental confusion</td>
<td>5 (1-5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not wanting others to care for me</td>
<td>5 (1.25-5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry about loss of sense of self</td>
<td>5 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future depression</td>
<td>5 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ready to die</td>
<td>5 (1-5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future fatigue</td>
<td>5 (1-5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future loss of bowel/bladder control</td>
<td>5 (1-5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unable to pursue pleasurable activities</td>
<td>5 (1-5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life in painности</td>
<td>5 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life tasks are complete</td>
<td>5 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceive self as financial drain</td>
<td>5 (1-3.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor quality of life</td>
<td>5 (1-8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current pain</td>
<td>5 (1-27.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unable to care for self now</td>
<td>5 (1-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current dyspnea</td>
<td>5 (1-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of support</td>
<td>5 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depressed mood</td>
<td>5 (1-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current mental confusion</td>
<td>5 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current loss of bowel/bladder control</td>
<td>5 (1-1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviation: IQR, Interquartile range (25th percentile to 75th percentile).

It is reasonable to ask why Oregonians who are capable of making the request for PAD are not availing themselves of it. It is because the request for PAD is often an afterthought, and some may wait until they are more ill and symptomatic to take it. For example, 20 of 56 of our study participants (36%) were enrolled in hospice. Similarly, physicians reported that 32% of Oregon patients were enrolled in hospice at the time of the first PAD request. In contrast, 86% of Oregonians who die by lethal ingestion are ultimately enrolled in hospice. Although experienced physical symptoms were not a motivator for initially pursuing a lethal dose of medication, they may be the choice of the patient to ultimately die by a lethal prescription.

A second limitation is that only 47 of 166 clients (28%) invited by CCO to participate enrolled in the study; those who volunteered to participate in our study may not be representative of other Oregonians at the time they first request PAD. For example, in our study, in 4 patients had limited self care or complete disability. In contrast, Oregon physicians reported that 59% of patients were con-
fired to bed or a chair for more than half their waking hours when first requesting PAD.\textsuperscript{11} The very reasons that individuals may not have been able to participate in our study—lack of energy, poor motivation, disabling physical symptoms, or functional impairments—may have contributed to interest in hastened death. Despite the potential for selection bias, there is substantial agreement between the results of the present study and Oregon physicians’ and hospice workers’ previous reports of patients in Oregon who choose PAD.

The results of the present study may provide helpful approaches for patients who request PAD. Patients who actively pursue PAD appear, at least initially, to be motivated by worries about future physical discomfort and impending losses in autonomy and function. Having witnessed intolerable deaths, these patients need to have their sense of control supported. Health care providers should focus on reassuring patients that all efforts will be made to ensure that they will be able to die where they wish and that pain and other symptoms will be controlled.

In opposition to legalization of PAD is based on moral and religious beliefs about the value of life and ethical concerns about physicians’ actions, then patients’ reasons for hastening death may be irrelevant.\textsuperscript{10} However, for many policy makers and health care providers, judgment of Oregon’s law is conditional and based on PAD being used as an option of last resort.\textsuperscript{10} Lethal prescriptions should not substitute for competent end-of-life care.\textsuperscript{2} Our data support the assertion that initial pursuit of PAD does not appear to stem from lack of access to symptom management. Alternatively, for some, support of PAD legalization was based on the specter of patients with grave suffering from symptoms that could not be controlled even with good care. This support may wane faced with evidence that experienced physical symptoms are not paramount reasons for requesting PAD. However, as noted by Casseu,\textsuperscript{27} it is not the absolute level of pain, but the meaning of the pain, the prospect of its worsening, and its effect on one’s sense of self that are the true components of suffering. Whether or not PAD can be justified, our findings clarify the source of these patients’ suffering, which may lead to more compassionate care.

Acknowledged for Publication: August 4, 2008.

Correspondence: Linda Ganzini, MD, MPH, Research Service (Mail Code RD& 66), Portland Veterans’ Affairs Medical Center, PO Box 1034, Portland, OR 97239 (Linda.Ganzini@va.gov).

Author Contributions: Drs Ganzini, Goy, and Dobacha had full access to all the data in the study and take responsibility for the integrity of the data and the accuracy of the data analysis. Study concept and design: Ganzini, Goy, and Dobacha. Acquisition of data: Ganzini and Goy. Analysis and interpretation of data: Ganzini, Goy, and Dobacha. Drafting of the manuscript: Ganzini. Critical revision of the manuscript for important intellectual content: Ganzini, Goy, and Dobacha. Statistical analysis: Ganzini. Obtained funding: Ganzini, Goy, and Dobacha. Administrative, technical, and material support: Ganzini and Goy. Financial Disclosure: None reported.

Funding/Support: This study was supported by a grant from the Northwest Health Foundation and Career Development Awards from the Department of Veterans’ Affairs Health Services Research and Development Service (Drs Goy and Dobacha).

Role of the Sponsor: The funding source had no role in any aspect of the study.

Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Veterans Affairs.

REFERENCES


Physician-Assisted Suicide — Oregon and Beyond

Susan Okie, M.D.

In February, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to consider the legality of the Bush administration's effort to outlaw physician-assisted suicide in Oregon, raising the possibility that a ruling by the Court during its next term could effectively invalidate the controversial Oregon law known as the Death with Dignity Act. With the events leading to the death of Terri Schiavo focusing national attention on end-of-life decisions, the Court's acceptance of the case formally known as Oregon v. Ashcroft is likely to heat up the public debate on assisted suicide. The justices will hear arguments in the case, now renamed Oregon v. Gonzales, soon after starting a new term next October. A decision is expected by July 2006. Whatever the future of the Oregon law, the state's seven years of experience with physician-assisted suicide have greatly influenced thinking about end-of-life issues and the practice of assisted suicide, both in the United States and elsewhere.

This year, lawmakers in California and Vermont and in Britain are considering bills modeled on the Oregon law.

The case now headed for the Supreme Court began in 2001, when Oregon's attorney general, along with a physician, a pharmacist, and several terminally ill state residents, sued to block the Justice Department from punishing Oregon doctors and pharmacists for providing lethal medications to terminally ill patients who wished to end their lives. In May 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, stating that drug-enforcement officials could not use the federal Controlled Substances Act to penalize Oregon health care professionals, provided that they had followed the requirements specified in the assisted-suicide law. This past November, on the day he announced his resignation as attorney general, John Ashcroft appealed that decision to the Supreme Court.

Dr. Okie is a contributing editor of the Journal.
Perspective

Physician-Assisted Suicide—Oregon and Beyond

During the first seven years since Oregon's law went into effect, a terminally ill patient apparently ingested the full prescribed dose of medication but did not die; instead, he awoke from a coma almost three days later and lived for two more weeks before dying of lung cancer. David E. Frueh, 42, reportedly swallowed about 10 g of secobarbital powder mixed with water, applesauce, cinnamon, and a small amount of a sweetening laxative. His wife told a reporter that he woke 65 hours later and asked, "What the hell happened? Why am I not dead?" The Oregon Board of Pharmacy is analyzing drug residue remaining on the empty capsules and investigating other aspects of the case, such as whether the laxative might have interfered with absorption of the barbiturate.

Most died at home; only one died in an acute care hospital. The most frequent reasons for choosing assisted suicide, mentioned by more than 80 percent of patients, were loss of autonomy, loss of dignity, and loss of the ability to enjoy life. Thirty-six percent expressed concern about being a burden to family or caregivers; 22 percent cited inadequate pain control. Only 3 percent mentioned financial concerns. Researchers who have analyzed the personalities of patients choosing assisted suicide have found them to be exceptionally eager to control their own lives and retain independent. "I don't want to die knowing if it's day or night, not knowing anybody in my family," Richard Holmes, one of the original plaintiffs in Oregon v. Ashcroft, told me in 2001. "I want to know what's going on and do it myself. I'm going to do it in my Adios." Holmes had obtained a lethal dose of barbiturates from a doctor, but live about 36 percent of the people who have done so under the law, he never used it; he died of cancer in September 2002.

Although relatively few terminally ill patients in Oregon actually make use of the law, recent find-
ings indicate that many more consider doing so. Medical ethicist Susan W. Tolle and colleagues interviewed the next of kin of 1384 Oregonians who died of natural causes. A total of 226 respondents (17 percent) reported that their sick relative had mentioned considering assisted suicide. However, only 25 said their relative had formally requested a prescription for lethal medication. In 17 cases, respondents said the doctor refused the request or dissuaded the patient. 2 "It is on the minds of more patients and families than physicians have any idea of," Tolle said.

There is suggestive evidence that the widely publicized debate about the assisted-suicide law and its enactment contributed to overall improvements in end-of-life care in Oregon. According to Tolle, Oregon has the lowest rate of in-hospital deaths of any state. Hospice admissions increased during the late 1990s, and the state adopted a standardized physician's order form for recording patients' wishes with regard to the use or limitation of life-sustaining treatment. Among Oregon physicians surveyed in 1999, 76 percent of those who cared for terminally ill patients reported having worked to improve their knowledge of pain treatment. 3

Yet some Oregon physicians remain adamantly opposed to the law, maintaining that a patient's wish to hasten death may reflect unrecognized, treatable depression or a lack of support for other options. "When a patient says, 'I don't want to be a burden,' it may really be a question, 'Am I a burden?"' noted William L. Toffler, a professor of family medicine at Oregon Health and Sciences University and the national director of Physicians for Compassionate Care, a group that opposes assisted suicide.

Tolle made this comment in testimony before members of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill, who traveled from the United Kingdom to Oregon this past December to learn about how the law has worked. The bill that the House of Lords is considering, broadly modeled on the Oregon law, would legalize assisted suicide and euthanasia under specific circumstances, for patients who are terminally ill, mentally competent, and suffering unbearably. The committee was charged with investigating whether current British laws outlawing such practices should be changed.

British opinion on assisted suicide has shifted during the past decade, according to Mark Slattery of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society in England and Wales. Cases in which seriously ill British patients traveled to Switzerland to obtain lethal medication in order to end their lives have been widely reported in the media. In a nationally representative poll conducted last September, 82 percent of respondents said terminally ill patients who are suffering unbearably should be allowed to receive medical help to die, if they want it. The British Medical Association, the nation's largest physicians' organization, opposes the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill, but the Royal College of Physicians and the Royal College of General Practitioners recently dropped their opposition. The bill, which lacks government backing, is considered unlikely to pass this session. Earlier this month, the select committee issued its report, including a recommendation that "a clear distinction should be drawn in any future bill between assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia in order to provide (Parliament) with an opportunity to consider carefully these two courses of action, and the different considerations which apply to them." 4

Meanwhile, two California lawmakers held public hearings this past winter on another bill, closely patterned on the Oregon law, that they introduced in the state legislature in February. Democratic assemblymembers Patty Berg of Sebastopol and Lloyd Levine of Van Nuys brought witnesses from Oregon to the hearings in California to address concerns about how legalizing assisted suicide in this state might affect people with disabilities and how physicians evaluate the emotional state and mental competence of a terminally ill patient who requests lethal medication. A 1992 initiative to legalize euthanasia in California was voted down, and an assisted-suicide bill introduced in 1999 failed to pass the legislature, but Levine said he believes that the generally reassuring experience with the Oregon law has increased the chances of enacting a similar statute in California. "I would say this is not suicide," he said. "This is giving people dignity and control at the end of their lives." The state has already taken a number of measures to improve end-of-life care, including requiring that medical students be trained in pain management and that practicing physicians obtain continuing education in pain treatment and palliative care.

But Oregon's successful implementation of its assisted-suicide law might not be easily replicated in other states with more economically di-
The story of Terri Schiavo should be disturbing to all of us. How can it be that medicine, ethics, law, and family could work so poorly together in meeting the needs of this woman who was left in a persistent vegetative state after having a cardiac arrest? Ms. Schiavo had been sustained by artificial hydration and nutrition through a feeding tube for 15 years, and her husband, Michael Schiavo, was locked in a very public legal struggle with her parents and siblings about whether such treatment should be continued or stopped. Dissension by interest groups, media hyperbole, and manipulative use of videotape characterized this case and demonstrate what can happen when a patient becomes more a precedent-setting symbol than a unique human being.

Let us begin with some medical facts. On February 25, 1990, Terri Schiavo had a cardiac arrest, triggered by extreme hypokalemia brought on by an eating disorder. As a result, severe hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy developed, and during the subsequent months, she exhibited no evidence of higher cortical function. Computed tomographic scans of her brain eventually showed severe atrophy of her cerebral hemispheres, and her electroencephalograms were flat, indicating no functional activity of the cerebral cortex. Her neurologic examinations were indicative of a persistent vegetative state, which includes periods of wakefulness alternating with sleep, some reflexive responses to light and noise, and some basic gag and swallowing responses, but no signs of emotion, willful activity, or cognition. There is no evidence that Ms. Schiavo was suffering, since the usual definition of this term requires conscious awareness that is impossible in the absence of cortical activity. There have been only a few reported cases in which minimal cognitive and motor functions were restored three months or more after the diagnosis of a persistent vegetative state due to hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy; in none of these cases was there the sort of objective evidence of severe cortical damage that was present in this case, nor was the period of disability so long.

Having viewed some of the highly edited videotaped material of Terri Schiavo and having seen other patients in a persistent vegetative state, I am not surprised that family members and others unfamiliar with this condition would interpret some of her apparent alertness and movement as meaningful. In 2002, the Florida trial court judge conducted six days of evidentiary hearings on Ms. Schiavo's condition, including evaluations by four neurologists, one radiologist, and her attending physician.

Dr. Quill is a professor of medicine, psychiatry, and medical humanities and the director of the Center for Palliative Care and Clinical Ethics at the University of Rochester Medical Center, Rochester, N.Y.
This is the exhibit marked "SDM-4" referred to in the affidavit of Alastair Donald Macleod affirmed at Christchurch this 15th day of May 2015 before me:

Phillipe Frances Shaw
Solicitor
Christchurch

Review
A Solicitor of the High Court of New Zealand

Assisted dying in liberalised jurisdictions and the role of psychiatry: A clinician's view

Sandy Macleod

Abstract

Objective: Assisted dying is a contentious and topical issue. Mental disorder is a relevant influence on requests of hastened death. The psychiatry of dying is not a prominent component in the assessment of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) in jurisdictions with liberalised assisted dying laws. The literature on the assessment processes, with particular reference to mental status, involved in euthanasia requests is considered.

Methods: An experienced palliative medicine specialist and psychiatrist selectively reviewed the recent literature published about the mental health issues involved in euthanasia and PAS.

Results: Assessments of competency, sustained wish to die prematurely, depressive disorder, demoralisation and 'unbearable suffering' in the terminally ill are clinically uncertain and difficult tasks. There is a growing psychiatric and psychological literature on the mental status of the terminally ill. As yet psychiatry does not have the expertise to 'select' those whose wish for hastened death is rational, humane and 'healthy'. Rarely in those societies with liberalised assisted dying laws are psychiatrists involved in the decision-making for individuals requesting early death. This role is fulfilled by non-specialists.

Conclusions: There remain significant concerns about the accuracy of psychiatric assessment in the terminally ill. Mental processes are more relevant influences on a hastened wish to die than are the physical symptoms of terminal malignant disease. Psychiatric review of persons requesting euthanasia is relevant. It is not obligatory or emphasised in those legislations allowing assisted dying. Psychiatry needs to play a greater role in the assessment processes of euthanasia and PAS.

Keywords
Euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, depression, competency, suffering

Introduction

Over recent decades in several jurisdictions, including for a brief period the Northern Territory of Australia, there has been legislation for assisted dying for severe terminal medical illness. Legalised euthanasia and/or physician-assisted suicide (PAS) are currently practised in the Netherlands, Belgium, Estonia, Luxembourg, Albania, Switzerland and the US states of Oregon, Montana and Washington (Field and Curtice, 2009). Assuring mental competency and the exclusion of current psychiatric illness are tasks expected of medical assessors, who are rarely specialist psychiatrists. Ryan (1995) advocated mandatory psychiatric review of persons requesting euthanasia, a view supported by the RANZCP Section of Consultation-Liaison Psychiatry's Working Group on Euthanasia (1996). This was obligatory in the Northern Territory but is not in the law of the other jurisdictions. Psychiatry needs to play a greater role in the ongoing debates about euthanasia and contribute from the clinical, scientific, and ethical points of view (Naudts et al., 2006).

Euthanasia is the deliberate ending of another person's life at his or her request. Physician-assisted suicide (PAS) is defined as 'a doctor intentionally helping a person to commit suicide by providing drugs for self-administration, at

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the person’s voluntary and competent request’ (Materstvedt et al., 2003). Withholding and withdrawing futile treatments and palliative or terminal sedation are not considered euthanasia (Materstvedt et al., 2003). There are philosophical, religious, medical, financial and political arguments opposing and supporting killing on request. Reports about those countries and states with liberalised assisted dying legislations are becoming available and provide important insights into this practice.

The author has attended an estimated 10,000 terminally ill hospice patients over the last two decades. Clinical practice moulds professional opinion. It is impossible not to be influenced and biased by clinical experience. This article is not a comprehensive review of the literature on assisted dying. It is a selective review of published literature from jurisdictions with assisted dying legislations by a clinician working within a legal system prohibiting euthanasia and PAS, and with an interest in the psychiatric state of the terminally ill.

Over the last 50 years, medicine became scientifically capable of artificially sustaining life. For the first time, the very sick have options of living or dying. Assertive oncological treatments, aimed only to prolong life for weeks to months, are allowing cancer patients to live longer. Critical care and emergency medicine are able to salvage persons suffering horrendous injuries and illnesses. The survivors, however, may endure major disabilities including psychiatric disorders. Cancer and AIDS have been converted into chronic illnesses, allowing the accumulation of disease in multiple organs, including the brain. The process of dying is becoming increasingly fraught and difficult. Euthanasia debates do not occur in societies without health services sufficiently affluent to be able to keep persons artificially living (Spence, 2003). The fear of dying ‘badly’ (dysthania), rather than a fear of living (Spence, 2003), is a dominant concern of dying. It is impossible not to be influenced and biased by clinical experience. This article is not a comprehensive review of the literature on assisted dying. It is a selective review of published literature from jurisdictions with assisted dying legislations by a clinician working within a legal system prohibiting euthanasia and PAS, and with an interest in the psychiatric state of the terminally ill.

Legalised PAS and euthanasia

In 1996, for the first time in history, a democratically elected government in the Northern Territory made both euthanasia and PAS legal. The following year the Australian government overturned this territory law. In 9 months, seven patients had made formal use of this law and four died under it. In the Netherlands, euthanasia and PAS have been sanctioned and practised openly since 1991. The Dutch criteria for euthanasia include competency but not the exclusion of mental illness as prerequisites (Table 1) (Field and Curtice, 2009; KNMG, 2011). In 2001, 2.8% of all Dutch deaths were by euthanasia and PAS (van der Heide et al., 2007). This percentage had fallen to 1.8% in 2005 (van der Heide et al., 2007). Of a yearly average of 8,400 requests, approximately 2,400 are actually carried out (KNMG, 2011). In most cases the estimated shortening of life was merely more than 1 month (van der Heide et al., 2003). In 1994 the US state of Oregon legalised PAS but not euthanasia. This law was enacted in 1997. Terminally ill persons suffering ‘incurable’ and ‘irreversible’ disease considered to be in the last 6 months of life, who are capable of making a voluntary decision about their health care, have the information provided, communicate a choice, and not have a mental health condition that impairs judgement, may request PAS. The patient is prescribed a supply of lethal medication (a barbiturate) to be consumed orally. About 50–60 persons/year die of PAS (about 0.2% of all deaths). Between 1998 and 2004 only 326 prescriptions were written, and 208 ended their life this way (36% dying naturally) (Otie, 2005). In 2010, 96 patients were recipients of lethal medication prescriptions and 59 are known to have died ingesting the medications (Oregon Public Health Division, 2010). Similar legislation was passed in Washington in 2008. Since 2010 doctors in Montana are protected from prosecution for helping the terminally ill die, providing the patient is competent. Belgium legalised euthanasia in 2002, but not PAS or any other forms of life-shortening action (Field and Curtice, 2009). Belgium is the only country in which mental suffering from either somatic or mental disorder is explicitly acknowledged in law as a

Table 1. Dutch euthanasia criteria, 2002 (Field and Curtice, 2009; KNMG, 2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>The patient’s request must be voluntary, enduring and well considered.</td>
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<td>The patient must be well-informed about the current situation and prospects.</td>
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<td>All other options for care must have been exhausted, or refused.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Euthanasia must be carried out by a qualified physician with due care.</td>
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<td>The physician must inform the legal bodies.</td>
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<td>The physician must inform the local coroner that euthanasia has occurred.</td>
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valid basis for euthanasia (Naudts et al., 2005). The mentally ill person must be competent, continuously suffering unbearably, repeatedly express and record a wish to die, and be experiencing a severe and incurable disorder. Euthanasia represented 1.9% of all Flemish deaths in 2007 (Smets et al., 2010). Since 1942 the penile code in Switzerland has not criminalised assisted suicide provided the person who assisted is motivated by 'unselfish' reasons (Field and Curtice, 2009). The Swiss law, when created, did not envisage assisted suicide from a medical perspective (Guillod and Schmidt, 2005). Active euthanasia is illegal. A medical practitioner must assess the patient's decisional capacity and prescribe the lethal dose. The patient must directly administer the lethal barbiturate to themselves. The medical practitioner must assess the patient's decisional capacity and prescribe the lethal dose. The patient must directly administer the lethal barbiturate to themselves. The patient must not be 'unbearably suffering' or 'unreasonably disabled', and consistently wish to die. Since 1998 nearly 1000 deaths have occurred under this arrangement including nearly 100 British citizens, for the patient does not need to be a Swiss national (Field and Curtice, 2009; Joffe, 2009). Of 1800 Swiss requests for PAS each year, two-thirds are rejected after screening and half of the remaining die by natural causes, leaving about 300 assisted suicides each year (or 0.45% of deaths in Switzerland) (Gistel and Mauron, 2003). In the UK assisted suicide remains illegal, however encouraging suicide may not necessarily be prosecuted if the assistance is 'minor, reluctant and wholly motivated by compassion' (Director of Public Prosecutions, 2010). However the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) gives no specific assurance as to how it may respond, emphasising the uncertainty still existing regarding assisted suicide in the UK.

Requests for assisted dying

It is uncertain how frequent the occurrence of un sanctioned doctor-assisted dying is in countries in which euthanasia is illegal. Even anonymously, few clinicians are prepared to reveal an illegal act. Many relatives (and some doctors) presume an analgesic dose several hours before death caused death, rather than easing pain until the imminent natural death occurred. The classical example of this phenomenon is Dr. Schur's 'voluntary euthanasia' of the 53-year-old Sigmund Freud, dying of a jaw malignancy (Schur, 1972).

Public opinion polls suggest over 80% support euthanasia legalisation in the UK (Brunswith, 2005). In most developed countries a majority of the general population appear supportive. There is however a trend that as an individual moves from the street, to oncology outpatients, and to hospice care, their attitude toward liberalising euthanasia mellows. In the Netherlands 7% of all people whose death is expected request euthanasia preceding their death (Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al., 2010). Having initiated the process, 13% then withdraw (Jansen-van der Weide et al., 2005). About 17% of Oregonians are potentially interested in aid in dying, though only 1–2% actually request it (Ginzini et al., 2008) and 36% provided a lethal prescription die naturally (Okie, 2005). In Canadian palliative care patients 63% believed euthanasia should be legalised, yet only 6% would wish to initiate the request (Wilson et al., 2007). The proximity to the death bed contaminates opinion. This may also apply to medical practitioners. Doctors are less often in favour of actively shortening life than are the general public and nurses (Gielen et al., 2008). Specialities such as palliative care, geriatrics and oncology appear more strongly opposed than intensive care physicians and medical students (Gielen et al., 2008; Marini et al., 2006). The UK House of Lords (2005) summarised doctors' views as 'The closer their experience of end-of-life patients, the less sure professionals are about the prospect of a change of the law in favour of euthanasia'.

Requests for euthanasia are not uncommon in medical practice. It is reported that 47% of Australian doctors have received at least one request for euthanasia (Stevens and Hassan, 1994). GPs are the recipients of most requests, palliative medicine physicians probably the least. Patients cared for at home are more inclined to request assistance dying than those in hospital, who are more likely to request non-treatment (Cohen et al., 2007).

Acceptable criteria

It might be reasonable to presume that those requesting a hastened death would be frail and suffering severe (cancer) pain or other unpleasant symptoms. In the Netherlands cancer is the most common diagnosis (74%) of the requesters, 7% have cardiovascular disease, and 5% severe pulmonary disease. However relatively more patients (20%) with motor neurone disease (MND) died due to euthanasia or PAS compared with patients with cancer (5%) or heart failure (0.5%) (Maessen et al., 2010). In 2000/01, 2.9% of the requests for PAS were for psychiatric disease and 4.5% for 'weary of life' (Rupprecht et al., 2005). The major specific reasons for the requests were fear of pain (37%), deteriorating physical status (31%), hopelessness (22%), and dyspnoea (15%) (Marcoux et al., 2005). The most important concerns were non-physical (Marquet et al., 2003). Usually the concerns were multifactorial and included fears of dependence, loss of autonomy, loss of dignity, being a burden on others, and social isolation (Marquet et al., 2003). Loss of control appeared to be a core influencing factor. The personal and social factors were more relevant in encouraging the request than the physical and psychiatric ones (Rietjens et al., 2009). The characteristics of the 'weary' patients were old age (average 81 years), 'reasonable' health, aloneness, social isolation, and 'through or tired of living and physically deteriorating' (Rupprecht et al., 2005). These discontented citizens request 'suicide-by-doctor'. In only 20–30% of those who request euthanasia is it performed, though none
in the psychiatric group and 1% in the 'weary' group (Rurup et al., 2005). Thirty-nine per cent had died before the request could be granted and 38% did not meet the necessary criteria to allow euthanasia (Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al., 2010).

The Oregonian data suggest that patients do not request PAS because of unrelied physical symptoms, or inadequacy of palliative care services (most are simultaneously enrolled in hospice programmes), and neither are they depressed or socially vulnerable (Ganzini and Back, 2003). They request assisted suicide for psychological and existential reasons: they value control, dread dependence on others, are ready to die, and assess current quality of life as poor (Ganzini and Back, 2003). The most important reasons for their requests concerned loss of control, wishing to die at home, loss of dignity and independence, concerns about future pain, poor quality of life and self-care ability (Ganzini et al., 2009). Significantly the requests did not relate to distressing physical symptoms, financial concerns or poor social support. The concerns were about future worries of declining welfare. The majority who request PAS are in their seventh decade, well educated, middle-class, white, married, with cancer diagnoses, and complaining of loss of enjoyment and quality of life. The poor, the ill-educated, the uninsured and those without access to palliative care are not those who request PAS. In Oregon approximately one in two PAS requests are declined, usually because the patient does not suffer cancer (Ganzini et al., 2003).

Contrary to what may have been predicted (and is perhaps assumed by the general public), people request assisted dying, if they have the legal opportunity to do so, because of psychosocial, and not physical, symptoms.

**Psychiatry in PAS jurisdictions**

A critical component of the legal requirements introduced for assisted dying is that of the role of the medical profession. Doctors are asked to assess the patient and opine upon prognosis and mental status. In the terminally ill these are not simple and straightforward clinical determinations.

In the Northern Territory the patient under the law had to be certified to be of sound mind and making the decision freely, voluntarily, and after due consideration (Field and Curtice, 2009). A psychiatrist was required to examine the patient and confirm that they were not suffering from a 'treatable' clinical depression. Four of the seven patients considered (two died before the law came into effect, one after its repeal) had some symptoms of depression. One, despite current depressive symptoms and a probable subtherapeutic dose of antidepressant, was considered to be 'depressed consistent with her medical condition'. The other three to die were considered competent and not depressed. The psychiatric assessment was mandatory, raising concerns regarding cooperation, honesty and trust issues (Kissane et al., 1998). Indeed one patient assessed withheld relevant history. No ongoing assessment or psychiatric treatment was offered or proposed.

In the Netherlands physicians ask for a psychiatric evaluation for patients requesting PAS in only 3% of cases (Ganzini and Lee, 1997). However if a psychiatrist or psychologist has already been involved in patient's treatment care it was twice as likely that a request for euthanasia be made (likewise for palliative medicine involvement) (Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al., 2010). This may merely be an indication of case complexity. Since the law change in 2002 the person does not need to be competent when 'euthanased'. An advance request can be made, which remains valid despite altering health status. In 2005, 20% of cases of euthanasia and PAS went unreported and 0.4% of all deaths were the results of the ending of life without any explicit request by the patient (van der Heide et al., 2007). The Dutch medical fraternity believe that a person can have a death wish and not be clinically depressed (Maessen et al., 2010). To date most requests for those suffering mood disorders have been declined as there were still psychiatric treatment options remaining (Field and Curtice, 2009).

Objective criteria assessing suffering are neither available nor indeed possible. How the suffering is determined to be 'unbearable' rests upon the impression of the assessing doctor for there is no formal definition of this term (Dees et al., 2010). Ultimately the decision to enact PAS rests on how the doctor considers the patient's suffering. It could be argued that it is not patients exerting autonomy, but doctors exercising power.

In Oregon if the primary physician believes a psychiatric disorder is present, the patient must be referred to a psychiatrist or psychologist. The limited ability by primary care physicians to detect psychiatric disorder is well recognised. Only 6% of Oregon psychiatrists were confident that on a single consultation they could determine if mental disorder was influencing the request (Ganzini and Lee, 1997). In 2010 only one of the 65 persons who died of PAS had been referred for formal psychiatric or psychological evaluation (Oregon Public Health Division, 2010). Depression (in Oregon) may or may not invalidate a voluntary request, and treatment of depression only improves the desire for life-sustaining therapy in a minority (Ganzini and Lee, 1997; Ganzini et al., 1994). The key task for psychiatry in Belgium is the assessment of capacity. Normally the treating doctor will assess competency, except in those whose the doctor thinks will not die in the foreseeable future (Naudts et al., 2006). A mandatory psychiatric referral then occurs. These are generally those patients with mental illness (and without a terminal illness). Mental disorder does not necessarily imply incompetence and there are no established criteria for determining whether a patient is competent to choose death by suicide.

The current provision of psychiatric assessment, as legislated in these jurisdictions, would appear to be inadequate.
to perform the difficult tasks expected. Not only is psychiatry rarely consulted, the limited knowledge of the psychiatry of terminal illness raises the probability that the legal expectation of psychiatry is not achievable.

The psychiatry of dying

The prevalence of psychological distress and psychiatric illness in the dying is significant (Macleod, 2011). Affective changes in the brain and mind influence judgement and decision making. Most terminally ill people are at times fearful and anxious. Serious emotional turmoil is commonly associated with incapacity (David et al., 2010). At least 15% of terminally ill cancer patients are experiencing major depression (Holopä, et al., 2002), though this prevalence falls as death approaches (Macleod, 2011). A similar number are dysthymic, dysphoric and demoralised (Kissane and Kelly, 2000). Depression in the terminally ill is a complex and difficult diagnosis to make and depressed and demoralised patients are not necessarily competent (Kissane and Kelly, 2000). Delirium is a common, if not inevitable, syndrome during the final phase of a malignant illness. In the terminal phase of life up to 80% become delirious (Lawler et al., 2000).

Assessing capacity in those requesting PAS is difficult: as the cognitive capabilities required to decide on rational suicide are contestable. In the Netherlands consent is not invariably given prior to assisted death. Euthanasia without an explicit request from the patient amounted to 6.7% of all deaths in the Netherlands in 2001, and 0.4% in 2005 (van der Heide, et al., 2007). There had been discussion about the act, or a previous wish of the patient for the act, in 60% of these patients, as compared to 26% in 2001. Discussions with relatives had occurred in 80% and with colleagues in 65% of these cases, 10% of whom were unconscious at the time of the decision and 14% incompetent owing to young age. Termination of life without request is more common in Belgium, with 1.8% dying without an explicit request (a weighted prevalence) in 2007 (Chambse et al., 2010). In a sample of 208 deaths under the euthanasia law, representing 12% of the deaths during 2007 in Flanders, 32% were administered life-ending drugs without their explicit request (Chambse et al., 2010). The decisions to terminate the lives of these elderly, hospitalised patients in comatosed or demented states, who had previously indicated a wish for life not to be needlessly prolonged, were made by medical staff in agreement with the family, usually following a sudden decline in the patient’s health, leaving them unable to communicate.

The accuracy of the figures on euthanasia is complicated by how palliative sedation is defined. Palliative sedation refers to the intentional clinical practice of suppressing consciousness to control refractory symptoms (delirium, pain, dyspnoea, nausea, acute haemorrhage) during the last days or hours of life, in a manner that is ethically acceptable to the patient, family and healthcare providers. When there is no other medical means of relieving an unendurable symptom, sedation may be the humane clinical option. Palliative sedation is not euthanasia; the intent is to relieve suffering, not to kill. In Belgium since 2001 the rate of using continuous and deep sedation until death increased from 2.2% of all deaths in 2001 to 14.5% in 2007 in one study (Billson et al., 2009) and fall from 7% in 1999/2000 to 1–2% since 2001 in another (Broekgaert et al., 2011). In the study by Chambse et al. (2010), opioids were used for sedation in 83% of the cases (often as the sole agent). This suggests a very broad definition of palliative sedation. There is solid evidence that the dose of opioid and its rate of increase do not influence survival at the end of life (Good et al., 2005), and indeed indications are that the duration of life is actually prolonged by palliative sedation. Appropriate opioid, neuroleptic and benzodiazepine prescribing does not constitute the use of ‘life-ending drugs’. Barbiturate administration, however, does. Palliative sedation and the doctrine of double effect are issues potentially able to be manipulated by advocates and/or critics of assisted dying.

In the Netherlands in 2001, 5.6% of deaths involved the practice of ‘continuous deep sedation’, and in 2005 this figure was 7.1% (van der Heide, et al., 2007). In palliative care settings worldwide about 25% of dying patients receive palliative sedation (Macleod, 2011).

It is claimed that there is no evidence from the Netherlands or Oregon to justify concerns about the negative impact of assisted dying legislation on potentially vulnerable groups, such as older, uninsured, ethnic minorities, minors and disabled people (Norwood et al., 2009). The only group identified to have a heightened risk were people with AIDS (Batin et al., 2007). While in the Netherlands it is more likely to talk about euthanasia than to die a euthanasia death (Norwood et al., 2009), as yet there is no compelling information from countries allowing assisted death that competency and consent issues are rigorously adhered to.

High desire to die is present in up to 17% of the palliative care population (Nissim et al., 2009). In severely ill patients, the will to live fluctuates (Cochinov et al., 1993). The will to live is determined more strongly by psychological variables until the last few days, when it is supplanted by physical variables such as pain and dyspnoea (Cochinov et al., 1999). In terminally ill cancer patients, psychological distress rather than pain and functional status is the most influential factor determining the desire for hastened death (Mystakidou et al., 2005). The strongest factors are hopelessness, depression and anxiety (Mystakidou et al., 2005). The wish to die is not stable, especially if mental health problems are evident (Ganzini et al., 2000). Major depression was diagnosed in 59% of hospice patients who persistently desired a hastened death, but in only 8% of those who did not (Cochinov et al., 1993).

In Oregon it is estimated that about 20% of those requesting aid for dying are depressed (Ganzini et al., 2000,
an expected incidence. Concerned that the professionals and family members involved with Oregon patients who pursued assisted dying did not believe depression had influenced their choice, and that in 2007 none of those who died of PAS had been seen by a psychiatrist or psychologist, investigators studied the prevalence of depression and anxiety in terminally ill people requesting aid in dying (Ganzini et al., 2008). Although the investigators struggled to recruit subjects, of 58 Oregonians 15 met the criteria for depression (HADS and Beck, SCID-I), six of whom being of the opinion that their depression influenced their preference for PAS. By the end of the study 42 had died, of whom 18 had been prescribed a lethal dose, and nine had died by this method. Three (17%) of these 18 decedents had met the criteria for depression, though one had been successfully treated for depression before her death. It would appear that some cases of depression are missed or overlooked in the medical assessments. Elevated prevalence of depression has been determined in Swiss people seeking assistance to die. The largest right-to-die organisation in Switzerland (Euth) found 27% of those requesting assisted suicide were 'depressed' according to their volunteer assistants (Boeshard et al., 2008), and 36% of hospitalised palliative care patients demanding death were depressed (Moynier-Vantieghem et al., 2010). However in neither of these studies was depression diagnosed according to accepted research criteria.

Those Oregonians who received substantive intervention such as control of pain, hospice referral, psychosocial and antidepressant medication, were more likely to change their mind about PAS. They also had less advanced disease. Eleven per cent had a change of mind after an antidepressant trial. Those whose decision altered were more ambivalent and unstable with regard to the initial request, not as hopeless, and had a few treatment options available (Ganzini et al., 2000). In Oregon, no PAS patient has contacted emergency services after consuming the lethal medication, though this would need to be done within 25 minutes (Okie, 2005). In the Netherlands 13% had a change of mind (Jassan-van der Weide et al., 2005). This was less likely in the terminal phase and more likely if there were mental health problems. Instability of attitude concerning PAS, generally toward rejection of an earlier supportive view, occurred in 8-26% of non-terminally ill hospitalised elderly American patients, particularly if depression lifted (Blank et al., 2001). A study of depressed geriatric patients' preference for life-sustaining therapy found that 25% showed an increased desire for such therapy after treatment for their depression (Ganzini et al., 1994). In AIDS patients with desire for hastened death, 27% of whom had major depressive illness, those who responded well to antidepressant treatment after 2 months dramatically reduced their wish for an early death (Breitbart et al., 2010). The 37% of patients whose depression did not respond had no major alteration in their desire to die early. Depression does not inevitably account for desire for death but there is a possibility that treatment of depression may alter significantly the incidence of PAS requests. Existential variables may have a stronger effect on the desire to die than psychological and psychiatric ones (Cochinov et al., 2005). The desire for death may be driven by the intolerable future rather than the intolerable present (Sullivan, 2005). Spiritual well-being (a sense of meaning and peace) is an important modifier of the desire to die, and even if depressed, it is protective (McClain-Jacobson et al., 2004). The percentages of patients changing their view about PAS, perhaps 10-15%, whilst small, would be considered to be an acceptably high operating mortality in surgical practice. Of additional concern is the clinical impression that by offering further treatment options (such as chemotherapy for the cancer patient), the patient's view about euthanasia may alter. This underlines the tenuousness of hastened death ideation.

Suicidal thoughts occur in as many as 45% of terminally ill patients, though these are usually fleeting and often associated with feelings of loss of control and anxiety about the future (Brock, 2000). The frequency of completed suicide in the cancer population is about twice that in the general population (Misono et al., 2008), with the highest risk in the months after diagnosis (Croceeti et al., 1998). Suicide is the cause of death in less than 1% of the cancer population and the risk is very low in the terminal phase (Nissim et al., 2009; Ripamonti et al., 1999). 'Psychological autopsy' studies suggest that 80% of persons with cancer who committed suicide were clinically depressed, about the same as for those suicides without cancer (Henrikson et al., 1995). Relatively few terminally ill patients kill themselves, yet some wish to be killed by their doctor. Finlay (2003) suggests that suicide and euthanasia are driven by fundamentally different needs, the former by depressive illness, the latter by a desperate way to gain the last vestige of control over a situation. Historically society has viewed suicide as a mortal sin, a criminal offence, a mental illness, and since the 1970s Western society has started to consider suicide as a calculable category of risk (McManso, 2005). Identifying and attending to these risk factors, thereby preventing suicide, has become a major public health issue. To dismantle the general community from committing suicide, and yet allow it in specific instances, risks complicating suicide prevention education.

Conversations about dying, death and suicide are important components of the practices of palliative medicine and psychiatry. For some 'euthanasia talks' (the negotiations around the request and the process) are in themselves apparently therapeutic. Euthanasia practice in the Netherlands typically involves extensive deliberations with the patient, the majority of which do not end in a euthanasia death (Norwood et al., 2009). Paradoxically, these discussions tend to affirm social bonds, social life and life. This is consistent with the findings that advance care planning can
positively enhance rather than diminish patients' hope (Devisson and Simpson, 2006). The provision of a 'lethal bullet' may result psychologically in an enhancement of the patient's control over their desperate predicament, an improvement of their esteem and a reinvigorated wish to live until nature determines otherwise. Referring to Oregonians who decide not to ingest the prescribed barbiturate, Quill (2005) commented: 'Perhaps the knowledge that they could end their life if they so desired makes them feel less trapped — therefore freer to keep going'. It may be that a planned and orchestrated death, and the avoidance of an uncomfortable death-bed vigil, may facilitate less traumatic grief reactions for family and friends (Swarte et al., 2003). However most working in palliative care observe the helping and healing dynamics of families during those final days, but there is no doubt that some individuals and families may prefer ordered and sanitised death.

**Assisting dying**

Doctors may buckle with the psychological issues associated with their dying patient. The fatigued, hopeless and despairing doctor confronted by a patient requesting assisted suicide may more easily acquiesce or subtly encourage the act. Clinicians burdened with the care of the very sick, who are frustrated by therapeutic impotence, struggling to communicate effectively, and seduced by the apparent rationality of the request, may become, like their patient, supportive and implicit in quickening death (Kelly et al., 2002).

Killing patients is a role most doctors appear neither to wish nor want. It may be, not surprisingly, distressing for the practitioner. In the 1990s 75% of Dutch doctors expressed feelings of discomfort following euthanasia, 58% following assisted suicide, and 34% following life ending without an explicit consent (Hevicekate et al., 2001): 'Many physicians who had practised euthanasia (in the Netherlands) mentioned that they would be most reluctant to do so again' (van der Maas et al., 1991). In Oregon doctors attending persons requesting PAS report being intimidated by patients to assist, and of being powerless to influence the decision-making process (Stevens, 2006). In the USA 53% of physicians who reported participating in euthanasia or PAS were comforted from having helped the patient, 24% regretted being involved and 16% reported that the emotional burden of performing euthanasia or PAS had adversely affected their medical practice (Emanuel et al., 1998). Oregon doctors who had participated, particularly those involved in the early years, acknowledged the difficulties it aroused emotionally. They consider themselves insufficiently prepared, fearful of making errors, and being personally damaged by the experience (Dobraca et al., 2004). It appears that the personal and professional experience of therapeutically killing is discouraging doctors from accepting these patients onto their books and they are withdrawing from the process. For their own self-protection some doctors in the Netherlands apparently attempt to avoid involvement in euthanasia cases (Stevens, 2006).

**Euthanasia and psychiatry**

Relatively rarely do patients request assisted dying in jurisdictions in which it is legal. If they do so the clinical problems initiating the request are psychosocial and existential rather than medical. There are psychiatric concerns about euthanasia and PAS, yet psychiatry is infrequently consulted and involved in the decision-making processes. Literature from countries and states with liberalised assisted dying laws and the palliative medicine literature are indicative of some specific areas of concerns regarding the mental status of those requesting hastened dying. The oscillations of the wish to die of the terminally ill, the difficulties of diagnosing major depression toward the end of life, the effect of depression and demoralisation on euthanasia requests, and of what constitutes fitness to commit on rational suicide are significant and as yet unresolved clinical issues. Concerns of a 'slippery slope' remain, for competency determinations appear not to be actively adhered to in some jurisdictions. Subjective medical impressions of suffering need to be supplanted by solid objective evidence-based literature and clinical guidelines. Medical practitioners of euthanasia and PAS appear reluctant and increasingly unenthusiastic participants in the processes, 'Euthanasia talks' may be therapeutic but medicinal killing, despite the informative experiences of jurisdictions in which it has been legalised, remains a controversial practice.

Every doctor who attended patients whose quality of life is poor and where no effective treatments are known or available. Psychiatrists are familiar with resistant affective disorders, chronic unremitting psychoses, and intractable anorexia nervosa. If legal liberalisation occurs the obvious evolution of pro-euthanasia advocacy is towards addressing those with intractable mental disorders and those weary with life in general. Psychiatry should be forewarned.

The euthanasia debate will not vanish from modern society. Society and politics will ultimately determine the legality of assisted dying in any community. As yet psychiatry does not have the expertise or the will to 'select' those whose wish for a premature death is rational, humane and 'healthy'. Whether the profession will ever achieve this knowledge is uncertain. But until this is obtained doubts and concerns about assisted dying within psychiatry (and medicine) will persist.

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